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Introduction: A research agenda around institutional copying and bricolage
In 1927, the British established the East African Governor's Conference with the aim of harmoniously exploiting the fisheries in Lake Victoria. Under this umbrella representatives from Tanganyika (today Tanzania), Kenya and Uganda met once or twice a year to discuss fishing quotas (Tvedt, 2010: 117) . In hindsight, the relevance of this body vastly exceeded the management of fish stocks. The cooperation between the three colonies gradually evolved into the East African High Commission, a predecessor of today`s East African Community, which coordinated a broad portfolio from veterinary research to railroad traffic in the three colonies. Somewhat neglected by economists and historians alike, the East African High Commission's headquarters in Kenya employed over 800 British administrators, economists, statisticians, customs officers, railway engineers, and -of course -fishery experts. They brought with them human capital which was scarce in this area in the 20 th century and which was much needed when the colony underwent intensive state building efforts in preparation for its independence.
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After independence in 1963, some of these men took up advisory positions in what was now the Kenya civil service. Others moved on to remaining colonies or retired. Although the role of human capital in long-term economic growth has been discussed at length (see for example Acemoglu et al., 2014; Glaeser et al., 2004) , we know very little about how individual colonial bureaucrats influenced the institutional development of the colonies in which they worked.
The paper discusses a research program originating from on a newly created digital dataset of the biographical entries of over 14,000 colonial officers, who served in the British Empire from 1939 to 1966. 2 Similar to modern international organization today, the British maintained personnel records of their staff. Formats and criteria of inclusion fluctuated over the centuries, but between 1939 and 1966 personnel records were collected in a consistent and systematic manner for those territories administered by the Colonial Office in London. 3 The personnel records contain granular details about an officer's education, training and career steps. Because the colonial service employed a wide range of professions, the career tracks of the men and women who ran and eventually wound up the British Empire will be interesting for many academic disciplines. One could think of questions related to medical history or tropical health, mining, forestry and more. The outline given in this article reflects my personal interest in the connection between institutions and long term economic growth. The aim of this article is therefore twofold: First, I will lay out the fundamental background knowledge necessary when working with this data. This will be done in more detail, because the details in the records might be misinterpreted without the necessary knowledge about administrative processes in the British Empire of the 20 th century. The second part of the article presents first findings from within the data which fall into my research interests.
The initial interest in creating the dataset is connected to my research agenda in institutional copying, by which I understand the effort to emulate institutional arrangements from another society or another country. This effort can be deliberate, when actors are conscious that they are adopting a foreign institution or less deliberate, when actors simply replicate norms or institutions, with which they are already familiar, into a foreign context. A large body of literature debates the connection between institutional reform and economic performance. 4 In developing economies, efforts of catching-up often involve institutional copying from the industrialized world. Such reforms are likely to fail when the imported institutional solutions lack contextualization -i.e. they are incompatible with the local legal and social environment. (Boettke et al., 2008; Berkowitz et al., 2003; North, 1994: 366) . The result is the illusion of a reform with few of the intended benefits. 5 The new institutional regime may even present a major irritation to existing laws and practices . While this institutional incompatibility is gradually being recognized as a major stumbling block for economic development in 2 The digital collection was established at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton from 2014 to 2015. I am very grateful to Prof. Dani Rodrik (now at Harvard Kennedy School) for his invitation and his support. 3 Between 1939 and 1966 the number of colonies fluctuated. After the war, 54 single territories existed. Of these, 45 gained independence in the 20 th century while nine remained British territories. Table A 1 in the appendix gives a list of the colonies. Important territories lay outside the authority of the Colonial Office. Notably the Dominions (e.g. South Africa, Australia, Canada), India (including today's Burma and Pakistan) and the Sudan were major colonies with separate identities, which maintained their own colonial service corps in the 20 th century. The biographical records of former officers from the Indian Civil Service and the Sudanese Service can be found in the dataset, if they joined the colonial service after the independence of India and Sudan (in 1947 and in 1956 respectively) . In this article, the term 'colony' is used for all types of dependent territories (such as protectorates) which were under the administration of the Colonial Office in London the literature, we still lack models and hypotheses of how the problem can be overcome (Seidler, 2014; Rodrik, 2008) . The biographical dataset was compiled in response to this question. The records cover the career paths of officers during the period of decolonization, when colonial administrations focused on state building and thus intensively imported British institutions. In African colonies for example, state building began in the 1950s and significantly accelerated in the last five years prior to independence (Lee, 1967: 205) . At its peak over 20,000 colonial officers orchestrated these reforms in 45 colonies. The analysis of over 14,000 of the career paths of the most senior officers among them permits the investigation of the role of human agency in the process of institutional copying.
The focus on individual actors is a new methodological approach to investigate institutional copying. The aim is to move a rather abstract debate on the conditions of institutional reforms, in which sufficient knowledge and motivation of agents is silently assumed, to very concrete questions: Who was involved in institutional copying? To which extent did officers influence the quality of institutions in former colonies? While the empirical analysis of the granular details in over 14,000 biographies has great potential (see also the second part of the article), the question of what exactly officers did when they imported institutions can be only be answered by the individuals themselves. A series of interviews with retired colonial officers began in 2016 with this question in mind. Because former colonial officers are a rapidly declining group of people, efforts have focused on the collection of interviews and little analytical work has been done. In its final stage both collections, the digitized entries and recorded interviews will permit methodological triangulation to strengthen the validity of information drawn from the data. This research agenda relates to two related bodies in the literature. Studies investigating the diffusion or the transfer of policies and innovations (Rogers, 2010; Stone, 2004, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 ) and the comparatively smaller field of institutional copying (Couyoumdjian, 2012 gives an overview). The role of agency is addressed in either field, as individuals are needed to administer the transfer (e.g. literately write down bodies of law) and to potentially adapt imported institutions to local conditions. Without such ex-ante adaptation, the new institutions is likely to entail high enforcement costs (Chang and Evans, 2005: 103; Hodgson, 2006: 7) . In the literature on policy transfers the terms 'translation' (Campbell, 2006: 510) , 'bricolage' (De Jong, 2013) and 'assemblage' (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2009 ) are used, partly to explain why a transferred policy from one country may look substantially different in another country (Stone, 2017: 10) . In the institutional literature, 'tailoring' has recently been coined to describe efforts of creating a better fit in the receiving country (Seidler, 2016) . The two bodies in the literature differ on how human agency is modeled. Both approaches share that human intermediaries are involved in the transfers and that their knowledge and interests will influence the outcome. Zweynert (2009: 353) for example, suggests that the person in charge of localization needs to be perfectly familiar with the society in question. The reforms in during Japan's Meiji period supports Zweynert's case. Highly trained Japanese bureaucrats were sent abroad to study European institutions and to create well adapted copies in Japan. Westney (1987) gives a well-balanced account of how these bureaucrats used both, the technical knowledge they gained abroad and their familiarity with the conditions in Japan to create hybridized institutions. Even though individuals with this mix of expertise are arguably rare, a sufficiently high level of human capital is often assumed in the literature on diffusion or policy transfers. Conversely, 'institutional tailoring' has been coined in relation with developing countries, where the lack of expertise is a huge bottleneck and the availability of technical expertise combined with local knowledge may be critical for the success or the failure of the transfer.
The biographical entries of British colonial officers will help determine the extent to which institutional tailoring took place in the colonies. The British had no central policy of deliberate adaptation of imported institutions to local conditions. Instead, there was a general interest in maintaining high, i.e. British standards in practically everything from the qualification of local personnel to the standards in housing construction (Tanganyika, 1954:17; Burr 1985:130 ). Yet, they are reports that institutional adaptation occurred in places -sometimes unnoticed by superior officers in the colonial capital (Seidler, 2016) . With this research agenda in mind, the article begins with the background knowledge necessary to interpret with the data. The third section returns in more detail to some aspects of the research agenda. 
Fundamentals
Working with the biographical entries of colonial officers will require a minimum of understanding the ins and outs of service in the British Empire. This section informs about the dataset itself and about the information that can be derived from its entries. It also provides enough background information on the British empire in the 20 th century to permit meaningful analysis for a wide range of academic disciplines.
The present dataset contains 14,280 biographical entries. These are all senior colonial officers in service between 1939 and 1966 who served for at least ten years. With few exceptions, the entries were annually published in the Colonial Office Lists between 1939 and 1966. 8 With strong recruiting after 1945, this makes the collection essentially a post-war collection of biographical records.
Senior officers
Before 1953, senior (or "higher") posts were loosely defined as those with responsibility and decision power in the administrative, executive, professional and technical grades (Adu, 1965:18) . After 1953, seniority became more closely defined as posts with the rank of a Deputy Head of Department (or field equivalent) and above. At the beginning of the data in 1939, the bulk of the senior officers are British (English, Scottish, Welsh, Irish) or nationals from the Dominions (e.g. Australians or South Africans).
From 1945 onwards, we see local staff taking senior posts -initially still labeled as "Africans in European posts" in some territories (Adu, 1965: 18 
Ten years of service
From 1948 onwards, the British stopped maintaining biographical entries for staff of less than ten years of service, partly in response to a shortage in paper after World War II. The distribution of officers with less than ten years of service was fairly even across the colonies and I found no non-random factor influencing it. This makes the dataset not a complete but still a good representation of colonial officers serving between 1939 and 1966.
Recruitment and terms of employment
The recruitment of all senior officers was the responsibility of the Colonial Office in London. The selection process allowed little room for negotiations as to where a recruit would be posted or which functions he would fulfill. 10 The Colonial Office did not publish vacancies (Kirk-Greene, 2000: 131) .
Interested individuals submitted blind applications in the sense that they applied for service in the colonies. Accepted candidates received a telegram in which a specific line of work in a colony was offered to him. After that it was a take-it-or-leave-it decision. By default, all senior posts offered lifelong employment -a practice the British continued until shortly before independence (Lee, 1967: 36) . Employment contracts were established between the colony (represented by the governor) and the new recruits upon arrival in the colony. Territorial employment contracts meant that the majority of officers spent their whole career in a single colony. Transfers between colonies were more frequent among colonies which cooperated inter-regionally or were sometimes offered after independence. Territorial employment contracts also meant that the salaries were paid out of the territorial budgets of the colonies. Until 1961, Britain made no direct financial contribution to the personnel serving in the colonies (ODI, 1964: 23) . 11 Consequently, richer colonies could afford more staff. This changed after the World War II, when substantial funds were made available under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which indirectly financed employment in poorer colonies (Hermans, 1974: 106; Jeffries: 1972: 37; Lee, 1967: 129; ODI, 1964b: 58; Younger, 1960: Annex V) . Figure 1 shows that new funds were put to use after 1945. Strong post-war recruitment gradually equalized differences in the number of staff between colonies. Preparing for independence paradoxically entailed that more officers were employed to wind up the empire. The high levels of employment prevailed until the late 1950s, when the independence of the first colonies relieved the pressure on manpower. Between June 1945 and end of December 1953 a total of 11,357 new overseas officers came into service (Colonial Office, 1953) . This batch of young officers is strongly represented in the dataset.
The numbers
The total number of permanently employed overseas officers peaked in 1960 with about 20,500 (KirkGreene, 1999: 74) . The vast number of colonial personnel however, was local staff in lower grades such as clerks, non-commissioned policemen, teachers or foremen etc. It is safe to say that no one ever kept a central record of these employees. In 1948, Charles Jeffries, then Deputy Under-Secretary of the State for the Colonies, estimated the total size of the colonial service at about 300,000 of which about 4% were thought to be expatriate officers (Jeffries, 1949: 28 and 96) . Until today, this is our best estimate of the full size of the colonial staff.
Figure 2 brings some of these numbers into perspective. The British Empire was run by a thin line of senior officers. In the figure below, the first two groups are cross-sections of staff numbers from the years of 1949 and of 1960 respectively. The last group represents the officers on which we have biographical records. This is the cumulative number of all officers entering into the ten-year cohort between 1939 and 1966. Colonial Office, 1950: 25) . 12 The ultimate goal of being able to exchange officers from the same service across colonies was never fully implemented. 13 The Colonial Office in London served as recruitment center for the senior personnel employed into the unified services. Governors in territories regularly sent lists with their demand for staff to London who recruited on their behalf. The practice continued unchanged until 1966 even when more and more locals from the colonies were selected into unified service careers. 14 Table 1 gives a selection of services (with the year in which they were unified) and other non-unified careers ('appointments') in the colonial service.
12 The purchasing power of £580 from 1950 was £18,724 in 2017 using an average inflation rate of 5,32% p.a. Additional payments ('expatriation pay') and taxation schemes varied across the colonies.
13 Exceptions existed for the Audit Service and in colonies with close regional cooperation. Railway engineers in the East African High Commission territories (Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda) for example were regularly posted in any of the three territories.
14 The colonies also used so-called Crown Agents in London who recruited on their behalf for all other posts and professions (e.g. electricians, policemen, traffic inspectors etc.), which were not provided by the colonial service. Finally, the major part of employees was recruited locally from the population. The dataset contains these posts too, if the employee changed into the colonial service and rose into senior ranks. Conditions of work differed across services. Surveyors, mining experts and foresters for example found themselves out in the field, while accountants or legal positions were often based in larger towns. In many services, junior grades would work in the field and rise to top positions in the colonial secretariat in the capital. An education officer for example, typically started as a teacher or headmaster in a school and could be promoted to an inspector of schools. Successful education officers eventually took up positions in the education department in the colonial capital. Different from the other services and appointments, members of the Administrative Service represented the governor in their colony and held (depending on the post and location) policy setting, executive and quasi judiciary powers. They also enjoyed authority over all other services (Colonial Office, 1950: 14-17) . Administrative Service officers were generalists chosen from a specific social class in Britain, whose strength rested in their esprit de corps and in their high degree of flexibility. They could stand in as local judge for some time if necessary, or double up as social Welfare Officer where needed. Speaking local languages was mandatory and years of service in remote rural posts ('the tours') were normal for young Administrative Cadets and District Officers before positions in the colonial secretariat, basically the government headed by the governor in the colonial capital, were considered (Kirk-Greene, 2006: 61).
In the data, the composition of the functions and appointments of senior officers in a given colony reflect the conditions in the colony. Timber exporting colonies for example have a higher share of foresters. This trend intensifies considerably after 1945. Before the war, colonial administrations had a narrower focus on keeping stability and collecting taxes. Figure 3 gives the eight most common appointments in African colonies in 1938. The figures are taken from the Hailey Report (1938) and are probably the most accurate cross-sectional data on a single continent. In 1938, colonial administrations in Africa were dominated by members of the Administrative Service, the Police and the Medical Service which among them accounted for 42% of all posts (Figure 3 ). In comparison, Figure 4 shows the most common appointments of young recruits who were sent to African colonies between 1946 and 1956. Almost 30% of this batch is again Administrative Service Officers who were strongly sought after in the very first years after the war, when governors needed the flexibility in lack of detailed human resource planning. They were followed by technical experts needed for economic development, mainly engineers and agronomists in the early 1950s. In the final years before independence the emphasis would shift again -towards education and legal services. Arguably, the need for experts in bringing about economic growth and development began with these last colonial officers who were recruited to wind up the empire. Experts or technical advisors, from engineers to accountants have been a central element in international development efforts ever since and their role has been debated in the literature (Easterly, 2014) . Very recent initiatives such as the Sustainable Development Goals set by the United Nations again incorporate both, the export of international standards into developing countries and the use of foreign experts to advise local bureaucrats on how to work within the new regimes (UN, 2017). 
Information in the biographical entries
The digitized biographical records provide detailed information about an officer's career and education. Figure 5 is scan of one of the entries. Mr. Smith's biographical entry can be regarded typical for a successful career in the Administrative Service. The entry in Figure 6 shows the four pieces of information given in all biographical entries (without *) and seven details (marked by *) which were dropped, if the information did not apply. Besides the year of birth and potential decorations, valuable information can be drawn from secondary school. In the UK, secondary school education typically takes place between 11 and 16 years of age. The school name also informs about the location of childhood (here: London) and about the social status of the officer's family. Cardinal Vaughan School is listed as a public school, which in Britain are fee-paying independent secondary schools not everyone can afford. Military service was mandatory in the 1940s and 1950s and is therefore very common in the entries. We also learn about the officer's academic training (if any). In this case, the officer's school and university degree in Oxford are signals for a career in the Administrative Service, which the officer joins in Northern Nigeria aged 23. Each of the services had specific ranks of hierarchy connected with a salary range. In many services, the rank and title also indicates whether this was a field based or town based position. Reconstructing this allows us to identify the level of authority and the income of the officer at given moments in his career. The rank of an Administrative Cadet was the entry level into the Administrative Service. It was also the lowest rank to constitute seniority (see above 2.1). The colony (here Northern Nigeria) is usually not repeated with each advancement unless the officer changes territory. Changes in service (which were rare) can be reconstructed from breaks in the procession of ranks and titles. This entry is rather typical for a successful career in the Administrative Service. J. H. Smith served nine years in field positions until he was called into the office of the first Premier (probably as an advisor), when Nigeria gains independence in 1960. Not everyone continued employment in the civil service of the independent country. 15 J.H. Smith remains in the Nigerian civil service until at least 1964, when he is appointed director of the staff development center. We know nothing of the officer's career after that or after 1966, when the collection of the biographical entries was discontinued.
Human agency and institutional copying
The final section suggests how the dataset can be used to advance our understanding of the role of human agency in institutional copying. The underlying assumption is that the mid-20 th century was a period of intensified institutional copying and that senior British officers were in positions to influence this process and the outcomes.
An important question is to which extent an officer's skills and functions were likely to mediate the process of institutional copying at independence. A first analysis takes a look at the distributions of services and appointments across the empire. The assumption is that services are likely to act as the channel through which both, an officer's expertise and his tacit knowledge was transferred into a colony. A modern-day measure of government effectiveness serves as the outcome variable. If institutional copying was successful, this should be reflected in a higher quality of governance a few decades later. Figure 7 is taken from work in progress together with Claudia Williamson. 16 In the analysis, we 'froze' the colonial administrations one year before the independence of a given country and analyzed the composition of services and appointments held by the officers at that moment in time. There is considerable variation in this measure which will be addressed in more detail in a separate paper. At this point, the distribution of services reveals a first finding: Lawyers matter. The scatterplot indicates a strong correlation between the share of Legal Service officers in an outgoing colonial administration (horizontal axis) and the 2012 measure for Voice and Accountability taken from the World Bank Governance Indicators (vertical axis). 17 This is work at an early stage, but the value of legal skills seems plausible.
Most institutional copying is legal work as ministries need to be established and laws need to passed which are likely to emulate the British example. The rising importance of technical skills in this late period of the empire carries along a second dimension. Young engineers, agronomists or economists came equipped with technical expertise which was in high demand in the colonies and would be still needed after independence (Hodge, 2010) . Many officers with a more general education (for example in the humanities or in arts) may have struggled to continue their career after independence (Lee, 1967 : 199, Burr, 1985 . Officers, who as pupils had attended one of the UK's elite public schools, had often continued with a more general education in Oxford or in Cambridge. In the 20 th century, the provenance from leading schools in the line of Eton and
Winchester broadly correlated with a specific social class (Kirk-Greene, 2000: 136). As administrators or judges these men had administered the empire as 'thin white line' for decades (Kirk-Greene, 1980) . They were also in high demand as generalists during the first years of strong recruitment after 1945. A separate study will need to investigate how influential they were in steering the colonies from administration to development and ultimately to independence. At this point, there is much we can learn from the biographical records which provide detailed information on school attendance. First descriptive findings underline the influence of this group of officers. Only 1,848 officers in the dataset (about 7.6% of all 18 Yet they take an impressive 30% of all top jobs in the administration. 19 As expected, former pupils of leading UK schools served in the Administrative Service (about 28% of all Administrative Service Officers) followed by the Legal Service (about 13%). Figure 8 shows how unevenly these officers were posted across the colonies. St Kitts and Nevis and other colonies in the West Indies come out with lower shares, while 27% of all senior posts in British Somaliland were staffed with officers from leading schools in the UK. A consequential question is what officers exactly did, when they were in charge of institutional reforms in the colonies. Did they merely mediate in an ongoing process (e.g. by being present and contributing technical and tacit knowledge) or did some consciously adapt the foreign import to the local context? This question is a central part in a series of interviews with retired officers. The aim is to systematically map the profiles of the 'tailors' among the senior officers, i.e. those individuals who adapted British institutions to create a better fit for the outgoing colony (even against implicit or explicit orders from their superiors). Two cases from the interviews may serve as examples: A British administrator in Nyasaland (today Malawi) realized that the British institution of lay magistracy could not possibly be imported without adaptations, because there were no legally trained Clerks of the Court in the colony, who in the UK advise lay magistrates. He devised simplified versions of various British laws to be used by the lay magistrates on the bench -unseen by the public (Baker, written communication in June 2016) . In another case, an English police officer stationed in Northern Nigeria privately taught courses on general education at his home. He was concerned that the fast-track training, which young Nigerian police cadets received, entirely neglected transferring knowledge about the world outside their home districts. The courses were copied by officers in other districts and eventually became an established institution (Anonymous, Interview in April 2017). Ideally, triangulation with data derived from the biographical entries will permit the identification of specific conditions (e.g. posting away from the colonial capital, the period of time spent in a single colony or the officer's nationality) influencing the probability of an expatriate bureaucrat experimenting with imported institutions.
The biographical records of colonial officers are likely to contribute to important debates in the literature on colonial past and institutions. An influential argument made by Acemoglu et al. (2001) will serve as a starting point. In their seminal work, Acemoglu and co-authors argue that initial conditions and endowments differed between colonies and that in response, first European settlers created distinct economic institutions which persisted over centuries. The mortality rates of early settlers are used as an instrument for the nature of established regimes which can be either inclusive when the colony was found suitable for European settlement or extractive, when institutions were geared towards extracting resources. The argument has sparked an important debate about the origins of institutions that support long-term economic growth (Austin, 2008) . A research agenda based on the role of the individual in institutional copying can contribute to this debate. The fact that governors requested senior officers according to the perceived demands in the colonies works in our favor. The type of manpower and professions requested should reflect the nature of the economic and political regime of a colony. For a first analysis, I extracted the services from within the data on country level and grouped them into two categories -services and appointments supporting either an extractive or an inclusive regime. Police officers and prison guards, for example, would be a sign of an extractive regime, while land surveyors and educators would be needed to establish property rights and skills needed for an inclusive regime. Table A  2 and Table A 3 In Figure 9 , the blue bars indicate the share of officers with extractive functions relative to the full colonial administration of a given colony. The chart is sorted by the descending shares of 'extractive officers'. Yemen leads the group with 17,4% of her officers holding extractive positions. The red bars indicate the share of 'inclusive officers'. Mauritius and Hong Kong stand out from the crowd with shares above 25%. The chart indicates that only few colonies permit a clean categorization into either inclusive or extractive regimes: Hong Kong, Mauritius, Kenya and Nigeria have the biggest difference between the share of 'inclusive' officers and those fulfilling extractive functions. A surprising group of African countries seems to qualify for inclusive regimes: Tanzania, Nigeria and Gambia among others, run counter the argument of Acemoglu and co-authors. In comparison Botswana, which is often regarded the best governed African country, looks like an extractive regime. That said, a deeper empirical analysis using the dataset will be necessary to contribute to the debate.
Conclusions
This article discussed a new research program investigating the role of individual colonial bureaucrats in the institutional reforms that took place in British colonies before their independence. It is based on a newly established digital dataset containing over 14,000 biographical entries of senior colonial officers who served in British territories between 1939 and 1966. The article informed about fundamental background information necessary to work with the data and gave an impression of the potential findings originating from new methodological approach centered on the role of individual actors in institutional copying. The preliminary analyses presented in this article show potential in explaining the quality of institutions in former colonies. In a wider sense, the approach may also extend our understanding of how individuals may influence institutional reforms in developing economies.
While the digital dataset of senior officers is likely to generate a series of important studies, the interviews with the retired colonial officers themselves may take the research program to a radical individual level. If we want to understand why institutional reforms failed or succeeded, we need to understand who the main actors were and what they did. The biographical record of John H. Smith ( Figure 5 above) was presented as an example in the article. Mr. Smith was interviewed in July 2017. At the independence of Nigeria, he was among those officers who chose to remain in the country and who joined the Nigerian civil service, which makes his account the more interesting. Mr. Smith, who was posted as assistant secretary in the Premier's office just months before independence remembered how he had been only the third choice for this responsible position, because an officer educated in Winchester (the school the governor had attended and the governor's first choice) could not be found in Nigeria and an officer from Eton (the governor's second preference) had given up after a few of months. 
